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Korean Reunification: Problems and Perspectives

Yong Soon Yim*

In recent years, the global political arena has changed so drastically that even an enlightened scholar may not be able to pinpoint the future direction of the world. Perhaps the single most startling event in global politics this century has been the rise and demise of the Communist political empire. The Communists challenged a long-established capitalist system, and quite successfully established an empire within a relatively short duration in this century. Ironically, such a rapidly-risen empire has been crumbling so quickly that to even the most incisive expert on Communist politics, this political process is a most baffling event. In particular, the political events which unfolded in Eastern Europe have been a drama of worldwide interest. More specifically, the political events in the two Germanys, which eventually became one, were a most spectacular drama to everyone in this world. Understandably, many Koreans expected such a possibility on the Korean peninsula. Unfortunately, unlike the German unification process, the prospects for Korean unification have not been very promising.

Therefore, we may have to realize that we live in a world full of paradoxes. It is an unstable and even dangerous world as shown in the Middle East and the former Yugoslavia Federation. Yet there is enormous opportunity, such as in the German case, to make our lives much more fulfilling. The promise of our future is a higher goal of shared human destiny, despite ever-rising nationalism

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everywhere. As a whole, humanity has made great progress and acquired tremendous wealth, yet poverty is everywhere in this world. The ultimate human desire is a perpetual peace. Yet war, conflict, and hatred are persistent elements of world politics. As such a world is full of paradoxes, while we realize that there are so many stumbling blocks for the unification of Korea, we are still pondering the possibility of Korean unification in the near future. Bearing in mind such paradoxes, this paper will attempt to shed light on the problems and perspectives of Korean unification.

* * *

Both North and South Korea have proposed and enunciated numerous schemes to unify Korea. However, the most well-known proposal from North Korea was the scheme calling for the creation of a "Koryo Democratic Confederation." North Korea officially adopted this during the Sixth Congress of the Workers Party of Korea on October 10, 1980. Since then North Korea has repeatedly reiterated this proposal for unification to South Korea, sometimes with minor variations. Meanwhile, South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan proposed the adoption of "a constitution for a unified Korea" on January 22, 1982, at the ROK National Assembly to adopt. The Roh Tae Woo administration proposed a "Korean Commonwealth" plan, which was eventually changed this to the "Korean National Community" formula. The current Kim Young Sam administration has enunciated a proposal of a "Korean National Community" similar to the previous administration's but with slight changes in its contextual interpretations.

A careful analysis of the two Koreas' enunciated unification proposals clearly shows that there are significant differences between North and South Korea on the issue of reunification. First, there appears to be basic differences between the two Koreas on the matter of the approach to ultimate unification. South Korea contends that the reunification of Korea can only be achieved grad-

ually. Since there are substantial ideological and economic differences, South Korea argues that it will take some time to bridge and accommodate them. Thus, the first task is to establish a sense of mutual security in both the North and the South. Therefore, the peaceful coexistence of the two Koreas must be recognized as a necessary first stage. In contrast, North Korea takes a "once-and-for-all" approach to the unification question, contending that the longer the division exists, the harder it becomes to unify the country. Thus, North Korea is demanding overall political negotiations to hasten reunification.

Second, North Korea generally opposes the presence of any foreign troops in Korea, particularly the U.S troops in South Korea, as the major obstacle in reunification. Furthermore, North Korea fears that a continuing arms race between North and South Korea will jeopardize the hopes of reunification, and has proposed a mutual reduction of armed forces to 100,000 troops. Meanwhile South Korea responds that the presence of U.S forces is essential for the peace and stability of the East Asian region in general and particularly for a stable and gradual transition of the Korean political system. Furthermore it contends that until favorable conditions for peaceful unification can be achieved, a military balance of power between South and North Korea should continue even in the foreseeable future.

There are numerous differences on the ways the two Koreas can be unified, such as the way of forming a unified government and representing the two Koreas to the unified government itself and so forth. However, there is a surprising measure of agreement visible in the content of the unification policies of the two Koreas. First, both South and North Korea assert repeatedly that reunification is the most important goal for them. South Korean political leaders including President Kim Young Sam have made it clear that Korean reunification is the supreme task of the Korean people. Meanwhile, North Korean political leaders including Kim Jong-Il have repeatedly promulgated that reunification is the greatest national duty and a most important revolutionary task.

Second, both South and North Korea are in basic agreement that the unification issue is a matter of internal politics. South

Korea has asserted that unification is a problem between South and North Korea alone, and that no other nation should interfere in their mutual efforts. North Korean leaders including Kim Jong-Il have persistently claimed that unification is essentially an internal affair of the Korean people. Interference by other countries including the U.S. and China should not be permitted. The two Koreas go even further in support of this policy of non-interference. South Korea openly declares that it will not interfere in the internal affairs of North Korea. Reciprocally, the North Korean government claims at least on the surface to subscribe to the principle of non-interference in each other's internal affairs.

Third, the two Koreas fundamentally agree that Korea must be unified by peaceful means. Although North Korea attempted to unify the country by military means during the Korean War, its official policy, not as repeatedly announced in various policy statements, is a peaceful one. For its part, South Korea has stated clearly on numerous occasions in the last decade that only peaceful means are acceptable for accomplishing unification. Both Koreas, cognizant of the fact that their modernized military capabilities are mutually lethal once a war begins, constantly pledge to each other that they will avoid another catastrophe on the Korean peninsula.

Throughout an analysis of the positions of the two Koreas on the issue of unification, it appears that though there are some differences in their approach to procedural matters relating to negotiation, they agree that a peaceful unification of Korea is desirable. Why then is there such hostility or at least uncooperativeness between the two Koreas? As recent history clearly illustrates, contrary to the avowed mutual commitment to peaceful unification, there is ample evidence of mutual antagonism between North and South Korea.

In order to answer this paradoxical question, a clarification of the numerous intractable political problems entailed in reunification must be in order. The problem of mutual hostility between the two Koreas is political in nature. Some of these political problems are longstanding, but recently new problems have emerged to further hinder Korean unification. Therefore this paper will first address the long-existing political problems. First, one serious

problem they face is the fact that North and South Korea have been governed for too long a time under two distinctively different politically ideologies. The Koreans in both South and North Korea have been extensively socialized and indoctrinated with respectively strong ideological contentions and hatred for the other's ideology. Political and social values with strong ideological inclinations have been inculcated in each society for so long that the two parts of Korea have become practically alien to each other. Such different development processes have constantly reinforced mutually hostile behaviour, and this mutual hostility has become strongly political to the point where such learned behavior has become part of Korean nature. This process creates an enormous political problem for both parties. Thus, though the leaders of both Koreas pledge to seek to "transcend differences in ideas and ideologies," it is an empirical fact that "transcending ideologies" has never been an easy task.

Second, to many Koreans the past is still vivid. Immediately after its liberation from Japan, Korea was plunged into a conflict between rightists and leftists that resembled a civil war. It became so widespread that it encompassed labor unions, military establishments, journalists, and even high school and university students.

The single most divisive factor affecting relations between the two Koreas is the Korean War, which lasted more than three years (1950-1953). During the fighting, millions of Koreans suffered and thousands of families were dislocated. Thus for most Koreans, the Korean War became a political and a psychological symbol. Significantly, the war resulted in more than two million Korean deaths. During the conflict, many Koreans experienced the tragedy of fratricide. Local communists severely punished "the element of the right," while the rightists in turn took revenge on "the red element," as armies advanced and retreated. Both sides blamed these tragedies on each other.

Third, due to the Korean War and other events, the sense of insecurity that North and South Koreans have experienced for so long has imprisoned them within a cell of security dilemma. Of course North and South Korea perceive each other as the enemy. Particularly North Korea perceives the inter-Korean relationship as

a zero-sum game. Thus in order for North Korea to win, South Korea must be defeated. Following this sense of reasoning, North Korea has repeatedly sent armed infiltrations into South Korea. North Korea has also attempted massive infiltration through legitimate institutions in South Korea. This infiltration employed the use of numerous secret agents and guerilla units to disrupt the South Korean system.

To support such an effort to change the status quo on the Korean peninsula, North Korea has built up a quite impressive military force. North Korea has maintained a regular military force with more than a million men. The problem is that South Korea has to build sufficient military forces to counter the attempts of North Korea. Though South Korea might not perceive the political reality purely in terms of a zero-sum game, it cannot afford to lag behind in terms of military preparations. Therefore, it has built up its own military force of more than 600,000 troops. Such military preparation by South Korea in turn makes North Korea uncomfortable and even insecure. This reinforces the North Korean perception of a zero-sum game by guessing what South Korea intends to with their military forces. This vicious cycle of mutual perception creates for them a so-called "prisoner's dilemma" situation on the Korean peninsula. This situation is, to say the least, a major obstruction to reunification.

Fourth, Koreans have become a victim of the "group think." The group think refers to "a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members' striving for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action."¹ Ever since the Korean War, North and South Koreans have perceived each other in a very negative manner. North and South Korean leaders look at each other in remarkably similar ways. Both South and North Korea perceive whatever the other side proposes for negotiation as a deceitful trick or merely a propaganda effort. Both sides see the other as untrustworthy, irrational, treacherous, and so forth. In each society, political and social leaders have no choice but to con-

¹ Irving L. Janis, *Group Think* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1982).

form to this dominating thought. Due to the existing inflexible environment, anyone who might have an alternative thought would find it very difficult to survive in their respective society. Recently, the negotiating manner of North Koreans has tended to reinforce among South Koreans this kind of thinking. Whenever there is a negotiational meeting between North and South Korean representatives, North Korea constantly insists on carrying out its own terms to South Korea regardless of their relevancy to the conference agenda. In the past, if they were not accepted as North Korea desired, the meetings were cancelled unilaterally on the grounds of some other, very often irrelevant circumstances.

Fifth, the unification question is also complicated by the presence of a trait peculiar to Korean political culture and tradition. Throughout their history, Koreans have never been able to negotiate with political opponents. Koreans have never learned to accept compromise as a legitimate or even tolerable approach to politics and government. This attitude very often makes political competition emotionally intensive in Korea. Even a small factional conflict becomes an occasion to make a political statement. Not surprisingly, dissenting from or deserting the leadership of one's own faction is frequently construed as treasonous behavior. Bending a political principle even slightly, in order to achieve a practical result in such a situation, becomes a heinous political crime. Consequently, the victory of one faction over several others usually leads to a near total occupancy of the entire political and governmental structure by the winners. Once a faction loses power, the members of the losing group, and often their relatives, friends, and even following generations, suffer debilitating effects.. This type of political culture makes it extremely difficult to negotiate issues as important as Korean unification.

The five problems previously discussed are the kinds of problems that have been prolonged and sustained in Korean politics. There are also, however, numerous problems which interfere with Korean unification that have emerged recently in Korean politics.

First, as is well known, the North Korean economy is in shambles. North Korea has failed to repay so many foreign debts that international credit to North Korea has been evaporated.

Furthermore, North Korean food shortages, due to natural disasters and mismanagement of agricultural production, are quite severe. North Korea has begged for supplies and food in order to ameliorate the suffering of their citizens. It has been recently reported that China decided to revive "friendly prices" for North Korea to purchase Chinese products. The revival of the concessionary pricing practice means that China has embarked on "full-scale economic assistance"² to North Korea. Furthermore, many North Koreans have defected to other countries, including South Korea, in order to avoid starvation. It has been reported that the U.S. and the U.N. have shipped emergency food aid to North Korea on several occasions. Even the South Korean government and the Red Cross have sent vast quantities of rice and wheat flour to North Korea.

Furthering the aggravation to North Korean leaders is the fact that South Korean economic and industrial development has far surpassed that of North Korea. Before the 1960's, North Korea's economic and industrial capacity was somewhat superior to that of South Korea. Even the per capita GNP of South Korea was inferior to North Korea's. However, the GNP of South Korea surpassed that of North Korea in 1969. The the GNP of South Korea became almost three times larger than that of North Korea in 1973 alone. As time went by, this gap between South and North Korea has become even wider than before. A more impressive indicator is the comparison of North and South Korean per capita GNP growth. For example, North Korea's per capita GNP was consistently greater than that of South Korea until 1968. South Korea gradually of overcame the gap and then surpassed North Korea. Then it was simply no contest. By 1970, the trade volume of South Korea was more than three times the volume of North Korea. It became more than four times North Korea's in 1972, and more than ten times in 1976. Such patterns of trade development have become quite consistent between North and South Korea.

The problem with this enormous economical development disparity lies in the fact that the gap tends to create insecurity in the

² See *The Korea Herald* (July 15, 1996).

weaker party. It was South Korea which was very reluctant to open its doors to North Korea until 1960 for precisely this reason of economic inferiority. North Korea constantly propositioned trade, the exchange of workers, mail, and the reciprocation of other communication materials to South Korea in the early period of the 1960's. South Korea however, constantly refused to meet North Korean demands due to, of course, fear of infiltration and reluctance to show its weakness to its adversary. The position is now reversed between the two Koreas. The enormous economic development of South Korea has created a measure of insecurity in North Korea. At this point, it becomes impossible for North Korea to catch up or surpass South Korean economic capability. This time it is North Korea which is shutting its door to South Korea. South Korea proposes to open a dialogue to promote trade and even to exchange scholars and other cultural personnel and so forth with North Korea. North Korea however, has rejected any negotiation directly with South Korean government under the pretext of it being an illegitimate government. In the past, North Korea often demanded American troop withdrawal as a prerequisite for negotiational dialogues between them. Most recently, North Korea refused to talk to South Korea due to the failure of South Korean officials to pay homage to the late President Kim Il-Sung. A more important reason for such refusal however, is the fear that the impressive South Korean economic capacity might well dismantle the social and political structure of North Korea. The safe game for Kim Jong-Il, therefore, is simply to continue the unfriendly relationship with South Korea while solidifying its internal political base. Particularly, at this point there are numerous reports that many North Koreans have become rebellious to authority, stemming from the shortage of food and starvation. Some have even speculated that North Korea may collapse due to public riots and discontentment among the elite.

Perhaps, cognizant of the fact that North Korea's self-reliant economy has lost its competitive edge to the export-oriented South Korean economy, North Korea intends to open its economy partially to the world, but not to South Korea. For this purpose, North Korea sorely needs strong support from the United States.

Therefore, North Korea decided to settle the nuclear weapon issue with United States in Geneva in 1994. Under the 1994 U.S.-North Korean agreement, an international consortium known as the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) is set to build two light-water reactors in the North by 2003. Some experts estimate that it will cost more than \$5 billion to build two nuclear reactors in North Korea. Meanwhile, the United States will supply supplemental energy to North Korea. North Korea on the other hand, returned remains believed to be those of U.S. serviceman missing since the 1950-1953 Korean War through the truce village of Panmunjom in August, 1996. The U.N. Command in Seoul delivered \$2 million to North Korea in May 1996 in return for its efforts to recover the remains of U.S. soldiers missing from the Korean War. There is a possibility that North Korea may eventually join the proposed four-way talks with the United States, China and South Korea on the security of the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, North Korea, according to the development project of the U.N., will open the Rajin-Sonbong area to investments from abroad. In spite of all of these events, North Korea still refuses to talk to South Korean officials directly. This is due to North Korea's inferiority complex. Therefore, North Korea's inferiority complex has become an impediment to the reunification of Korea.

Second, the demise of the Communist empire has strangely become an impediment to Korean unification. The dismantling of the Soviet Union created numerous new states and released its control over Eastern Europe. Of course, the political events unfolding in Eastern Europe, particularly in Germany, have been a drama of worldwide interest. The political reform in East Europe has contributed positively to South Korea's on-going efforts for its "Northern" policy. South Korea has established diplomatic relationships and invested substantially not only in Eastern Europe, but also in China and most of the former Communist countries. German unification has furthermore had an enormous impact on the South Korean public. Many Koreans imagine such a possibility for the Korean peninsula. Some citizens have even become impatient and very vociferous calling for the Korean unification.

In contrast with the South, North Korea has become quite irri-

tated with what transpired in the former Communist countries. North Korea made every effort to fend off any grave consequences of the Eastern European events on its general public. The North Korean leadership has thus far been able to minimize any such impact on its society for at least two reasons. First, North Korea has been separated and largely independent from the influence of the Soviet Union since the 1960's. Furthermore, no Russian troops are stationed in North Korea. Thus, North Korea was not amalgamated with the Soviet Union as Eastern Europe was. Consequently, North Korea has been relatively immune to this recent historical tide.

Second, there is the proximity of Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union, whereas North Korea shares a border with Communist China. China took a very tough stance against Chinese reformists. That action was quite reassuring psychologically for North Korean leaders, and thus they have been able to resist the impact of Eastern European convulsions.

In spite of these conditions, there is much evidence to show limited but subtle effects of Eastern European, in particular German, affairs on North Korea. The political events that occurred in East Europe have forced North Korea into even greater isolation in the international arena. The political reform of Eastern Europe and the German unification apparently have made North Korean leaders uneasy. North Korea has re-emphasized the "Chungsan-li spirit," and very often declared "Let us live our own life in our own way." North Korea openly declared that Korean unification by absorption must not be materialized on the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, whenever South Korea proposes a peaceful unification method, North Korea perceives it as an attempt to unify Korea by absorption. In this respect, North Korea is not only reluctant to open its society to others, but also hesitant to have an open discussion with South Korea on Korean unification questions. North Koreans have witnessed that many East German officials have not only lost their jobs, but have also even been imprisoned. Even a former prime minister had to stand on trial for being an agent of the KGB. Therefore, the Eastern European events have become, in a strange way, an impediment to Korean unification.

Third, through history, the influences of the big powers have

become pivotal to Korean politics. Korea has been victimized throughout its history. Koreans are, therefore, very sensitive to the effect of big-power influences on their affairs. In the past, both Koreas were intricately intertwined with the major powers in international politics. South Korea developed a close association with the United States, Japan, and others. Meanwhile North Korea developed a strong linkage with the Soviet Union, China, and other Communist countries. This became a major obstacle to Korean unification.

Now the Soviet empire has been dismantled. The United States remains the only military superpower, and is able to maintain international order. In the past, the U.S. has been very helpful in trying to see Korea unified under the leadership of South Korea. This situation has recently been changed somewhat. Russian domestic politics and economic development are now very uncertain. It is possible that in the future, an extreme nationalist may take power in the Russian government. Recently, China conducted large-scale military maneuvers in the Taiwan Strait as well as test missile launchings. Furthermore, China declared that it will liberate Taiwan by force if Taiwan becomes an independent state. China has also repeatedly tested nuclear weapons. Recently, the Commission on America's National Interests, composed largely of the Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom, the Rand Corp., and Harvard's Center for Science and International Affairs, identifies five "cardinal challenges" for the next president in foreign policy as: coping with China, preventing the loss of control of weapons of mass destruction, maintaining a sound partnership with Japan and the European allies, avoiding a collapse of Russia, and maintaining the U.S.'s world leadership position.³

The United States, in order to control the future events in China and Russia, needs to maintain troops stationed in Korea. Furthermore, it has been reported recently that the United States has agreed to return the Okinawa military bases to Japan in the near future. In this respect, the U.S. needs a rationale to the American public and rest of the world for the maintenance of

³ See *The Korea Herald* (August 6, 1996).

American troops in Korea. Therefore the U.S., of course, would like to avoid a conflict in the process of Korean unification. Furthermore, as long as a Communist North Korea exists, the U.S. has a suitable rationale for maintaining troops in South Korea. At the same time, China will make every effort to make sure that it will not share a border with a prosperous capitalist state, namely a unified Korea under the leadership of South Korea. Therefore there is a congruency among the United States, Japan, and China in East Asia, in the desire to maintain two Koreas. Thus again, major power interests dictate the fate of Koreans. Recently in this respect, the United States, China, and Japan have been rushing to restore the North Korean economy.

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In spite of these numerous problems which hinder Korean unification, there are always opportunities evolving from unexpected events, which could serve to unify Korea. Whenever the unification methods are discussed, there are generally four schools of thought: namely, federalism, functionalism, neo-functionalism, and communication theory. Federalism tends to focus on important political decisions that can create unified political organizations. Federalists are concerned about formulation, constitutions, and distribution rights and duties among various agencies within constitutional domains. They view that congruence between existing conditions and formal location of authority is more conducive to the federation's success.⁴

Communication theorists contend that high levels of communication and transactions among countries will promote the formation of an integrated society. Widespread and frequent communications among citizens of different countries will accelerate the exchange of information and expand the pool of memories and mutual perceptions shared by elites and ordinary citizens.

⁴ See Riker, William R., *Federalism: Origin, Operation, Maintenance* (Boston :Little, Brown, 1964).

Increasing flows of communication and exchange of goods and services among countries tends to promote the joint adoption of administrative measures to accommodate further exchanges. This leads eventually to what Professor Deutsch has called "security community."⁵ Functionalism, developed by Mitrany, assumes that supplies must match demands for fulfillment of basic human needs such as food, shelter, and security.⁶ Increased specialization of production, and broader exchanges of goods and people among different countries, creates mutual need and demand to cooperate and eventually integrate people among different nationalities. This is purely a non-political approach, which is primarily reliant upon environmental changes. This environmental change will eventually force each government to accept the existing reality. Neo-functionalism is a slightly deviant approach of the functionalist version.⁷ Neo-functionalism is a mixture of functionalist theory and communication theory. At the same time, it utilizes the existing political institutions to stimulate the integration process. It assumes that political and other units established by agreements among nation-states, particularly in connection with common markets or economic agreements, may also create pressures for the strengthening of their own authority. Thus the neo-functional approach does not merely rely upon environmental changes, as advocated by functionalists, to create the need for the expanded international organizations, in order to accomplish ultimate integration. It rather relies on existing organizational activity, including political, to generate pressure which will incite the expansion of integrated international organizations. The neo-functional approach contemplates package arrangements that will have profound economic impacts on many spheres within the member countries. Such package arrangements can create new focuses of attention for lobbies and pressure groups within nation-states. These groups may attempt to develop alliances with similar groups in other countries to secure mutual

⁵ Deutsch, Karl W., et. al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).

⁶ Mitrany, David, *A Working Peace System* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1943).

⁷ Lindberg, Sean, *The Political Dynamics Of European Economic Integration* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963).

interests. This spillover effect enlarges the scope of the bargaining process at the international level.

There have been so many theories or hypotheses proposed and presented in the academic arena. However, a careful examination of these theories clearly shows that most of them belong to one of these four schools of thought presented here. Should Korean unification occur, it will most likely take the form one of these theories or a mixture of two, even three theories. With these theories, the perspectives of Korean unification process can be contemplated. The first possibility would be an amalgamation of one system into the other one. There have been numerous reports that North Korea might collapse. There is some degree of general unrest that apparently exists in North Korea. In general, federalism entails that the superior and better party will take a leadership role, and to absorb the others with their consent. A good example would be the German unification case. Should there be an extreme event occurring in North Korea, Korea can be unified under the leadership of South Korea. This is a plausible imagined scenario; however it remains to be seen whether this will occur in the future.

A second possibility is simply to maintain the status quo on the Korean peninsula. The communication theory contends that an important thing will not be the amalgamation of different states, but rather the maintenance of trade and exchanges of all types between nations. The most important thing is the establishment of a mutual security community between the states. At this point, the possibility of a violent attack on each other between the two Koreas has been substantially reduced. Should the negotiations between the four powers be successful, and if a peace system is established on the Korean peninsula, a security community will be in place. As long as there is an assurance of peace on the Korean peninsula, all kinds of exchanges between the two Koreas will follow. This is a possible scenario.

A third possibility is the creation of a new national community that will include attributes of both North and South Korea. This means a peaceful unification of Korea. In order to achieve this, though, there must be a compromise between the two governments to form a new Korean community. Or at least the govern-

ments from North and South Korea should be willing to hear what the other side suggests. Eventually, there must be a consensus between the leaders of South and North Korea. Without reaching a consensus between the leaders, nothing can be accomplished. Whatever the leaders agree upon, such attempts must have some measure of legitimacy to the extent that the people from both sides will accept the solution.

At this point, the third possibility is a remote one, especially for the near future. Therefore, the neo-functionalist theory is still conceptually the most relevant approach to stimulate the building of a new national community. In order to stimulate the process of the formation of a new national community, leaders of the two Koreas should make political decisions which will bring economic, social, and other benefits to the larger population in Korea. In return, those who have experienced the benefits stemming from the selected political decisions will induce pressure on their perspective governments to create more opportunities for furthering mutual exchanges between North and South Korea. Of course, in order to apply this neo-functionalism to the unification process, a mutual dialogue must be in order.

In conclusion, at this point the future of international politics is uncertain. At the same time, the future of Korean unification is also, at best, uncertain and even remote. Therefore, the first order is to establish a security community on the Korean peninsula. ■■■